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Many electoral malpractices are commonly thought to occur in polling stations (Birch 2011; Lehoucq 
2003; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Norris 2015a; Schedler 2002).  Accusations of ballot stuffing, voter 
intimidation and impersonation are often made in electoral autocracies but also in established 
democracies.  Similarly, it is often suggested that less deliberate problems occur in these places, such 
as long queues at polling stations, poor ballot design or restricted opening hours (James, 2014a).  
These claims are difficult to substantiate, however, as rival politicians make partisan claims to discredit 
their opponents or push for reforms that they perceive will maximise their votes (James 2012; Minnite 
2000; Piven et al. 2009).  Meanwhile, the media often focus on cases of maladministration such as lost 
ballot papers – giving a perception of widespread difficulties.  High profile individual incidents, 
however, can overshadow the millions of other votes accurately cast and counted and give an unfair 
perception of the overall quality of electoral management. 
This chapter argues that one way of trying to measure the frequency of any problems, and by 
implication identify the necessary policy fixes, is through the regular use of poll worker surveys. By 
asking those on the frontline of democracy, we are provided with new information about the extent 
of electoral integrity.  Although there are commonly many blockages in the policy process which 
prevent evidence based policy, poll worker surveys can make evidence based policy more likely.  
Surveys increase the transparency of how EMBs function and the extent and nature of any frontline 
problems in electoral democracy.  They also increase the accountability of governments and EMBs 
because the public dissemination of this information can help civil society contest claims made by 
these actors and dislodge any myths and claims about electoral integrity peddled by rival political 
elites.  In short, poll worker surveys can contribute considerably towards the 
transparency/accountability/compliance nexus outlined by the introduction to this volume and enrich 
horizontal accountability but also downward accountability. 
The chapter begins by explaining the types of problems that are often thought to occur in electoral 
administration and management.  The concept and process of evidence based policy making and 
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policy blockages are introduced and the case made for poll worker surveys as an instrument to 
encourage evidence based policy.  Hypotheses are derived about the expected performance of British 
electoral administration based on our existing knowledge.  The methods and results are then 
described.  The first-ever non-US poll worker survey was undertaken in Britain at the 2015 general 
election.  The poll worker survey (n=1,321) reveals this aspect of British elections to be in generally 
good health and contradicts the existing literature in a number of ways.  Our sample suggests that 
British poll workers, unlike their US counterparts, tend to be experienced at working in the electoral 
process and are drawn from a commonly re-used pool.  They generally thought that their training was 
of appropriate length, interesting and of practical use for the day.  Problems do occur, however.  These 
include: suspicions about electoral fraud, doubts about the identity of the electors, inappropriate 
behaviour from party officials, electors being turned away and queues at polling stations.  It is argued 
that the findings from this and other poll worker surveys can be used to ‘feedback’ into the 
recruitment of poll-workers, those concerned about the quality of oversight in a localised system of 
electoral management, and it has implications for the design of electoral laws in Britain.  
Common Defects in Election Administration and Management 
Studies that seek to assess the quality of elections in established democracies have usually focused on 
electoral systems, franchise legislation, and party finance. There has been a growth of studies, 
however, that seek to establish whether electoral integrity is compromised by problems in electoral 
administration and management.  Electoral administration refers to the ‘administrative systems 
through which the electoral register is compiled, and votes are cast and counted’ (James 2010, 369).  
A primary focus, going back to Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s study of Who Votes (1980) was how the 
voting and registration processes used for elections can shape turnout, confidence in elections and 
possibly who wins.  Worldwide, there are variations in how citizens cast their vote, the deadline by 
which they need to register and how they register, for example (Massicotte et al. 2004). Procedures 
have since been categorised as either being expansive in so far as they commonly increase electoral 
participation or restrictive in so far as they commonly reduce levels of participation (James 2012, 25-
61). Electoral management, meanwhile, focusses on the systems for managing staff and resources 
within electoral management boards.  The use of performance standards, audits and sufficient 
funding, for example, have been demonstrated to improve the quality of elections (Clark 2014; 2015; 
2016; James 2014a; Alvarez, Atkeson, Hall 2012a ;2012b).   
Three forms of electoral malpractice are commonly claimed to be present in electoral administration 
and management in democracies.  The first is that integrity of the polling and registration process is 
undermined by cases of and opportunities for electoral fraud by citizens or party agents.  Using a 
legalistic definition of electoral integrity, scholars have focussed on how electoral laws have been 
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broken by, for example, stuffing ballot boxes, personation in the polling station or casting bogus postal 
votes.  Some studies have sought to estimate or measure the number times electoral laws are broken 
(Ahlquist et al. 2014; Christensen and Schultz 2014), while others, noting the difficulty in measuring 
cases of electoral fraud, have argued that particular voting procedures, that are enshrined in national 
laws, undermine electoral integrity by having an insufficient security provisions (Lehoucq 2003).  In 
response to this, some advocate increased security provisions, such as voter identification 
requirements, removing convenience voting provisions such as mail-in ballots or asking citizens or the 
use of election monitors (Fund 2008; Sobolewska et al. 2015; Kelley 2012).  Critics, however, argue 
that actual cases of electoral fraud are few and far between and do not warrant the type of policies 
prescribed (Minnite 2010; Levitt 2014) and data from the perceptions of electoral integrity index 
suggest that this is not the most serious issue in most countries (Norris et al. 2015b).  Restrictive 
procedures are therefore commonly thought to be unnecessary. 
A second problem is that voting and registration procedures can provide bureaucratic hurdles for 
participation.  The classic rational choice institutionalist claim is that voter participation will be higher 
when the logistical costs of balloting are lower. Researchers therefore often prescribe more 
convenient or expansive voting procedures to maximise electoral participation.  These might include 
postal voting, election-day registration, public holidays on Election Day or remote electronic voting.  
Restrictive procedures such as voter identification, biometric voter identification or early registration 
deadlines should be discouraged because they will lead to a reduction in democratic participation (Hall 
2013; James 2010; 2012; Wang 2012). 
A third group of problems commonly identified are concerns about failures of electoral management 
and poor organisational performance (James 2014a) – such as errors made by returning officers and 
by election officials in the management of the polling process.  These are not necessarily the 
consequence of deliberate partisan efforts to alter the result of the election.  Instead, they might result 
from human error, under–resourcing or poor performance management systems and/or leadership 
(James 2013; 2014a; 2016; forthcoming; Clark 2014; 2015; 2016).  Although there are many examples 
of maladministration it is often unclear how systematic these problems are. 
The Promise of Evidence-Based Policy 
How can problems with electoral administration be diagnosed and addressed?  One approach is 
through the comprehensive collection, public availability and assessment of evidence.  This can lead 
to greater knowledge about the extent and nature of the problems which can inform the appropriate 
selection of policies.  This optimistic view of evidence based policy-making has been long desired.  It 
is informed by the enlightenment and a rationalist approach to policy making (Howlett 2009; 
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Sanderson 2002; Turnpenny et al. 2009).   Politicians have also expressed a concern for policies to be 
more evidence based – with the Blair governments in the UK, for example, expressing the view that 
‘what matters is what works’ (Parsons 2002).   
The prospects of evidence based policy have been well-criticised.   Post-positivists have widely 
questioned the modernist assumptions of making scientific progress.  Evidence based policy, critics 
argue, is also politically naïve.  Furthermore, human agency means that we actors are reflective, 
strategic and may change their behaviour in the light of ‘evidence’.  However, researchers from the 
realist tradition argue that although the world is partially socially constructed, social constructions 
have real causes and these causal processes can be the subject of study (Coles 2004; Pawson 2005).  
The prospects of evidence-based policy can also be considered if the multiple factors that affect policy 
outcomes are identified (as we do below).  A form of evidence-based policy is therefore possible 
(Pawson 2005) and it can therefore improve both the accountability of government effectiveness and 
the substance of policy outcomes (Sanderson 2002, 3). 
Deploying a simple five stage approach to the policy process, it is argued here that the use of poll 
worker surveys can contribute towards change in electoral policy and better electoral integrity 
outcomes (figure 1).  Governments, electoral management boards and multinational agencies often 
claim to deal with the problems with elections identified above based on evidence and ‘best practice’ 
yet it is often less clear how ‘best practice’ has been identified and whether it has really been adopted 
(Norris 2015b).  Poll worker surveys act as a useful policy instrument for helping to achieve evidence-
based policy. 
What is a poll worker survey? 
A poll worker survey involves asking those electoral officials working in polling stations on the day of 
the election about their experiences.  Following the 2000 US Presidential election the focus of research 
switched from voting technologies to the humans involved in implementing elections (Hall et al. 2007, 
647).  A small but growing  number of US research projects have therefore undertaken poll worker 
surveys to identify who poll workers are, what motivates them to serve and affects their enjoyment, 
whether they have the appropriate skills with technology to work on election day and how effective 
training schemes are for poll workers are (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2007a; Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 
2007b; Glaser et al. 2007; Mac Donald and Glaser 2007; Mockabee, Monson, and Patterson 2009; 
Senecal 2007).  Yet a review of the literature on poll workers concluded that more research was 
needed (Burden and Milyo 2015).  Moreover, this literature remains American in orientation.  This 
method or these empirical questions have not been explored outside of the US and certainly not in 
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the UK.  Nor do electoral management boards routinely publish data on the demographic profiles or 
views of their poll workers. 
A focus on poll workers’ experience is especially important because research has highlighted how this 
has been a problematic point in the implementation of elections (for example, see: Atkeson et al. 
2010).  There are also good theoretical reasons for undertaking poll worker surveys.  Recent work on 
electoral management has drawn from public management theorists who have long argued that such 
front-line workers are an important focus of study.  James (2014b) has argued that scholars should 
mine the knowledge and experience of electoral officials as a useful way of establishing the integrity 
of the electoral process and the suitability of the voting technologies.  This follows theories of bottom-
up implementation which argue that governmental projects, such as elections, can appear to be well 
designed from above, but can be flawed on the ground if policy-makers do not consider the unique 
perspectives that front-line workers have (Sabatier 1986; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).  According 
to Lipsky they constitute ‘street-level bureaucrats’ who have the opportunity to make and remake 
policy (Lipsky 1980). Meanwhile, Durose (2009) argues that such workers have ‘local knowledge’ 
which, citing Yanow, consists of: ‘a kind of non-verbal knowing that evolves from seeing, interacting 
with someone (or some place or something) over time’ (Yanow 2004, 12). This makes them uniquely 
positioned to understand the effects of different voting processes and problems with the functioning 
of elections. 
Poll Worker Surveys as Triggers for Change  
Having collected the information (stage 1 in figure 1) it needs to be disseminated (stage 2).   Both the 
survey findings and the data can be disseminated informally or formally (such as to structured 
committees) within EMBs, the government, other government agencies, political parties, pressure 
groups and academics.  They can also be made available to the public via the media or deposited 
online. 
Yet, providing information is not enough.  There is no guarantee that survey information will influence 
the decision-making process because of a number of well-known policy blockages (stage 3).  The 
government and political parties may consider that the survey findings or the policy proposals that 
may follow from them will adversely affect their electoral prospects (James 2012).  There might be 
resistance to change from within the civil service because of disinterest (Wright et al. 2013) or budget 
maximisation (Dunleavy 1991), cultural resistance or limits on the availability of resources (Clark 2014; 
2016).  However, in spite of this, the provision of poll worker information can influence policy by acting 
as a resource for civil society to hold governments to account (Gerken 2009; James 2015; forthcoming)  
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A poll worker survey may influence the decision making of a number of actors (stage 4).  It should 
provide an EMB with greater performance information which will allow it to address problems of 
adverse selection in the recruitment process. Derived from principal-agent theory, this is the problem 
whereby the principal (EMB) is unsure whether they have appointed agents (poll workers) of sufficient 
quality (Alvarez and Hall 2006).  It also provides important information about the quality of elections 
on the ground.  This information about the quality of elections is also of use for government, who may 
use it to introduce measures to offset difficulties.  It also provides them with important information 
about the performance of the EMB.  For civil society, opposition parties and the public then the key 
findings of poll worker surveys can help them to hold EMBs and governments to account.  Key 
information about the performance of the electoral institutions and the implementation systems for 
running elections can be used to propose alternative policies, champion change and criticise 
government policy (Gerken 2009; James 2015) (stage 4).  Electoral integrity outcomes are then at least 
partially a product of these institutions and practices (stage 5), which can then be subject of evaluation 
again (stage 1). 
In short, the policy blockages may therefore prevent poll worker surveys having a direct outcome on 
electoral policy.  However, they can indirectly lead to changes in electoral laws and management 
practices to improve the quality of the electoral process (stage 5).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Hypotheses 
On the basis of the comparative literature discussed so far, and the specific literature on Britain 
discussed next, it is possible to develop five hypotheses about the type and extent of the of the 
problems likely to be experienced in the polling process in Britain.  These hypotheses collectively 
embody a critical view that electoral integrity is commonly undermined at the polling place in older 
advanced democracies such as Britain. 
H1: Electoral fraud and intimidation at the polling station is widespread.  Britain has a relatively relaxed 
system of voter verification at the poll which only requires voters to state their name and address 
(Alvarez, Bailey and Katz 2008).  It also (at the time at which this research was conducted) had a system 
of household registration in which one person can add names to the electoral register.  Both of these 
have been criticised.  A judge presiding over high profile cases of electoral fraud in Birmingham an 
elections judge declared that the levels of fraud would ‘disgrace a banana republic’ (Mawrey 2005). 
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The voter registration system was previously described by international observers as ‘childishly simple 
to defraud’ (Council of Europe 2008).  One further form of electoral malpractice is the intimidation of 
voters by party officials.  There are tight requirements on where party officials can stand and behave 
at the polling station (Law Commission, Scottish Law Commission, and Northern Ireland Law 
Commission 2014) but the intimidation of voters during the polling process was a key issue raised by 
the judge presiding over the 2014 Tower Hamlets case (Mawrey 2015).  We might therefore expect 
there to be problems such as attempts at personation and voter intimidation. 
H2: Bureaucratic hurdles prevent voting.  Although there are no ID requirements and registration was 
done on a household basis, other voting and registration procedures are restrictive.   Citizens are 
required to vote in person at a specific polling station close to their home, unless they request a postal 
or proxy vote in advance. They cannot therefore vote at an alternative location close to their work or 
somewhere else more convenient.  In the run-up to the 2015 general election concerns were also 
raised about the implementation of individual electoral registration (James 2014b).  This was the first 
contest at which newly registering citizens would have to do individually and provide a national 
insurance number before their name was added to the electoral register.  Existing registrants would 
not be removed from the register until 2015 or 2016 (subject to a government decision) but it was 
thought that young and mobile citizens could be affected (James 2014b).  This was in the context of 
an electoral register that has seen a long term decline in levels of completeness to as low as 82% in 
2011 (Rosenblatt, Thompson, and Tiberti 2012). This raised the prospect of unregistered voters 
turning up on election-day.  Our second hypothesis is therefore that restrictive practices will lead to 
voters being unable to vote at the poll. 
H3: Failures of electoral management are widespread.  Advanced democracies are increasingly 
described as being ridden with electoral mismanagement.  Problems became apparent in the UK 
during the 2010 general election and reported in the international media at the 2010 general election 
because of queues at polling stations which prevented voters from casting their ballot and some 
polling stations running short of ballot papers. An Electoral Commission review estimated that 1,200 
people were affected at 27 polling places in 16 constituencies (Electoral Commission 2010).  We might 
expect four core problems to be found: 
 H3a: Poll workers are inexperienced.  One criticism of US election administration on polling 
day is that many poll workers are inexperienced, employed only for the short term of the 
election (e.g. Hall et al. 2007; White et al. 2015).  Since British staff are employed for the day 
only, we might expect the same to be true there. 
 H3b: Training is of low quality.  The literature on poll workers has generally argued that their 
training may not be adequate for the pressures that they are likely to face on polling day (e.g. 
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Hall et al. 2007).  A decentralised delivery system is thought to contribute towards this (Gerken 
2009).  The UK also has a decentralised delivery system with local government officials 
responsible for implementing training.  However, Clark (2015) shows variation in the extent 
that returning officers meet centrally defined standards.  We might therefore expect variation 
in training, with some perceiving their training was of poor quality. 
 H3c:  Other frontline problems are common.  As noted above the 2010 UK general election 
exposed many problems with the quality of electoral management.  In the run-up to the 2015 
general election local authorities had to undertake major cuts and evidence shows that 
funding can influence election quality (Clark 2014; 2016).  We might therefore expect a range 
of other problems to become apparent. 
 H3d:  Satisfaction with the democratic process is likely to be low.  As a result of the above three 
problems, the confidence that those on the frontline have of the health of the democratic 
system would be low. 
Research Design 
The British 2015 General Election Poll Worker Survey was designed and implemented to establish the 
demographic characteristics of British poll workers, the training they undertake, the extent to which 
they find the training satisfactory, the problems they face implementing elections and how 
widespread these problems are.  
There are three different types of ‘poll workers’ in the UK.  Presiding Officers’ duties include 
responsibility for liaising with the key-holder of the building, organising the layout of the polling 
station, maintaining order in the polling station, monitoring tellers outside of the poll and supervising 
polling clerks. Polling clerks are responsible for checking the eligibility of electors against the register, 
marking the register and issuing ballots to the elector (Electoral Commission 2015a, 2-3).  Counting 
Assistants sort and count the ballot papers at a central location, after the ballot boxes have been 
securely transported from the various polling stations (Electoral Commission 2015c).  All three are 
appointed only for the temporary purpose of the election alone. 
The survey was developed from a previous questionnaire, the Ohio Poll Worker Survey, which was 
used in Ohio’s 2008 Primary election (Mockabee, Monson, and Patterson 2009). The 2015 
questionnaire was developed and adapted for British circumstances. It contained questions on 
recruitment, training, motivations for working at the election, election day experiences, views of the 
democratic process and more general demographic information. With the co-operation of electoral 
services departments in eight English local authorities, hard copies of the questionnaires were 
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distributed to poll workers on election day along with pre-paid envelopes, asking them to complete 
the survey after the election and return it by post.   
The participating local authorities were based on a convenience sample. Of the fourteen local 
authorities approached, eight agreed to participate. Four local authorities were located in the North 
East of England, and four in Norfolk.2 These local authorities, between them, administered 21 of the 
650 parliamentary constituencies at the general election.  Convenience sampling is often criticised for 
not guaranteeing a representative sample (Bryman 2008, 183-4). Notably, the local authorities did not 
include those where the most prominent cases of electoral fraud have been found, such as 
Birmingham or Tower Hamlets. While acknowledging these criticisms, there is unfortunately no way 
to sample or survey polling station workers in Britain without gaining access through electoral services 
departments at close to 400 separate local authorities. No national database of polling station workers 
exists, nor were the authors able to obtain an estimate of the numbers of polling station workers 
nationwide. A representative sample would therefore be extremely difficult to achieve. Selecting 
authorities where problems had knowingly taken place would further risk the difficulty of ‘selecting 
on the dependent variable’.3  
This notwithstanding, such a convenience sampling strategy is common in organisation and 
administration studies (Bryman 2008, 183). The study covers eight local authorities, who administer 
the electoral process in twenty one parliamentary constituencies.4 It therefore provides greater data 
than has hitherto been collected, and in different parts of England.  Gaining agreement from local 
authorities to participate meant that it was possible to distribute a questionnaire to every polling 
station worker which was employed by those local authorities. In other words, this was a full 
population survey of the poll workers within the eight local authorities who agreed to take part.  Most 
studies of poll workers have studied specific locations rather than deploy a nationwide random sample 
(Hall,  Monson, and Patterson 2009; Claassen et al. 2008).  
Participating local authorities appear broadly representative of wider levels of electoral administrative 
performance. The average performance of the participating local authorities is close to the nationwide 
mean for British election administration in Clark’s (2015) index of performance in the 2010 general 
election.5 The partisan make-up of these constituencies was: two marginal seats (1 Liberal 
Democrat/Conservative, 1 Liberal Democrat/Labour); Four comfortable Conservative seats and two 
safe Conservative seats; Two Labour comfortable seats and 11 Labour safe seats. The average 
electorate across the 21 constituencies was 66,829, with a mean turnout of 63 per cent. Excluding 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, which have slightly different electoral arrangements, the average 
constituency electorate in 2015 was just under 65,000, while the mean turnout across the two regions 
was 64.6 per cent, and across England and Wales 65.8. Based on census 2011 data, the broader 
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representativeness of the eight local authority areas on a range of socio-economic occupational 
variables is detailed in table 1. Surveyed local authorities have an occupational structure slightly less 
concentrated at the higher ends of the occupational spectrum than in England and Wales, and slightly 
more at the lower ends, but appear broadly representative. The methodology is therefore appropriate 
and accepted in this field of study. 
 
(Insert table 1 about here) 
 
In total, 3,350 questionnaires were distributed to poll workers by their local authorities on the day of 
the election.  Poll workers were asked to complete and return them by mail in a pre-paid envelope to 
the researchers.  The response rate was 39.4 per cent. The analysis is therefore based on responses 
from 1,321 polling station workers in a mix of rural, urban and mixed local authorities and 
constituencies. This is an acceptable response rate for a postal survey. All responses detailed below 
are rounded to the nearest whole number.   
Results  
Electoral fraud 
It should be stressed at the outset that most poll workers appear to have had a trouble-free polling 
day. This nothwithstanding, we found a small number of problems.  The key findings are summarised 
in Table 2.  Across the eight authorities, 11 poll workers (just under 1 per cent) suspected one case of 
electoral fraud.  This figure may overstate the actual number of cases because two poll workers in the 
same polling station may have reported the same case.  However, the cases were spread over five 
different local authorities, meaning that there were at least five such cases.  A related problem of 
integrity was poll workers encountering people asking to vote whose identity they were unsure of.  
With no requirement for voter ID, electors simply have to state their name and residence to the poll 
worker before being given a ballot.  Poll workers’ perceptions of the integrity of this process gives a 
unique first-hand reflection on this act through their ‘local knowledge’.  A small but significant 
propotion of poll workers, 6 per cent, encountered at least one such individual.  Cases were found in 
all eight authorities.  The survey also asked poll workers whether they had ‘no problems maintaining 
the secrecy of the vote at the polling station.’  Again, a small but significant proportion, 5 per cent, 
‘strongly disagreed’ or ‘disagreed.’ Based on this sample, suspicions of ‘bogus voters’ among poll 
workers and problems with voter secrecy are are few in number, but do exist. 
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Table 2 also illustrates that cases of voter intimidation were again limited to a few in number, but the 
inappropriate behaviour of party officials can pose a problem.  Over 5 per cent of poll workers 
reported some problems, although these were mostly limited to individual indiscretions by one 
individual party official. Qualitative comments by poll workers suggested that ‘Tellers’ were acting 
within the rules, but were intimidating electors, by for example, ‘causing obstruction at the entrance’.  
Younger voters in particular, not aware that they did not have to give them their poll card number, 
were described as being intimidated.6  
 
Highlighting the tension between transparency and ballot security, a less serious problem, which, 
depending on how it is practised, could be categorised as electoral fraud, is citizens taking photos (or 
‘selfies’) in polling stations.   This is legal in many countries, such as the Netherlands, and encouraged 
as a means of increasing turnout but taking pictures of ballot papers is illegal under UK law and many 
polling stations now display signs forbidding the taking of photos in and around the polling station. 
Experience of observation at British elections by one of the researchers has suggested there are some 
difficulties in this area. While some of this appears innoccuous, pictures can potentially be used to 
identify people who have voted, while pictures of completed ballot papers may be used in fraudulent 
schemes. Polling station workers were not always as aware of the difficulty as might be expected in 
previous elections.   There was therfore a high profile public awareness campaign before the election 
by the Electoral Commission to discourage it (Rudgard 2015). Cases of this were low but also still 
present, with 5 per cent of poll workers coming across at least one case. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Bureaucratic hurdles 
The data suggest that electors being turned away from the polling station because their name was not 
on the register was a more widespread difficulty. As table 2 demonstrates, just under a third of poll 
workers (31 per cent) reported no problems, but the remaining respondents turned away at least one 
person.  The modal response at 39 per cent was 2-5 people who asked to vote but were not on the 
register. Given that polling stations can be as large as 2,500 electors (Electoral Commission 2015b, 7), 
this figure is low.  However, it does identify a problem for some citizens wishing to cast their vote, as 
under different rules, they may have been able to vote.  Qualitative responses to the survey suggested 
that many of these may have been people who had gone to the wrong polling station.  In some cases 
this was because their polling station was different to last time, others seemed to have not read their 
poll cards.  Some polling stations were able to contact their central team to identify where citizens 
should be voting.  But other teams did not know where to redirect voters, either out of a lack of 
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knowledge of what to do or because they could not contact their main office because the telephone 
number provided was often engaged.  Citizens seemed to have not voted as a result of these problems.  
One clerk said that: ‘a number of people turned round after we redirected them to correct station, 
saying they could not be bothered going thus losing approximately 20 plus voters’.  Another 
complained that they should have had a list of other polling stations.   Better poll card design or 
allowing citizens to vote at different polling stations may have prevented this problem.   
Poll worker quality  
The survey asked a range of questions of poll workers to establish their socio-economic characteristics. 
In both regions, the ranks of poll workers are predominantly female. Women account for 63 per cent 
of the sample of poll workers. This gender split holds, and is statistically significant at the p<.01 level, 
when considering the different positions held by the respective genders. Around 57 per cent of 
presiding officers were women, and 42 per cent men. Similarly, around two-thirds of polling clerks 
were women. In terms of their ethnic background, 97 per cent of poll workers were White British.  
According to the 2011 Census, 96.8 per cent of the combined populations of the local authorities 
included in the study were ‘White British’. This, of course, may well be different in some of the major, 
and considerably more multicultural, British cities such as Birmingham or London 
Understanding who participates is an important indicator in political science. The average age of 
polling station workers in 2015 was 53 years of age, with age ranging from between 20 to 82 years 
old. Just over three fifths were employees with a further 31 per cent indicating that they had retired. 
Slightly over half (52 per cent) indicated that they had to take time off to work on polling day. Just 
under a third (32 per cent) of poll workers claimed an annual income of between £10,000 to £19,999, 
with a further 32 per cent claiming an income of between £20,000 to £29,999.  In terms of occupation, 
43 per cent of poll workers were either managers or administrators, with a further 18 per cent from 
clerical backgrounds and 17 per cent from a profession or technical occupation. 
Poll workers typically have to follow complex guidelines on polling day while dealing with electors, 
sometimes under pressure. This means that there is a premium on staff that are either well educated, 
or experienced in complex administrative tasks performed accurately and swiftly. Certainly, poll 
workers appear to be relatively well educated. Approximately the same proportion of respondents 
claimed to have undertaken higher education below degree level as reported holding a university 
degree (just under 24 per cent respectively). A further 21 per cent reported having the equivalent of 
‘O’ level education, with, at the other end of the educational spectrum, 10 per cent being educated to 
postgraduate level. This compares with 2011 national census figures for England and Wales of 27 per 
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cent educated to degree level or above, 28 per cent educated to the equivalent of ‘O’ level/GCSE and 
12 per cent holding ‘A’ level higher school qualifications.  
British poll workers were experienced at their jobs.  While just under a third (32 per cent) had worked 
at four elections or less, the average number of elections which British poll workers had worked at 
was 9.6. This will include local and European elections, by-elections and so on, not only general 
elections. Remarkably, a small proportion of respondents claimed to have worked at more than 30 
elections. On average, as might be expected from the responsibility of the position, Presiding Officers 
had worked at around 15 previous elections. By comparison, polling clerks had less experience, having 
only worked at between 5-6 elections on average.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Experience at previous elections impacts upon how poll workers are recruited to work on election day. 
Table 3 sets out the methods through which poll workers were recruited to work in the 2015 general 
election in both regions. The predominant method of recruiting poll workers was through the pool of 
people who have previously had experience of staffing polling stations. The dominance of those who 
have worked previously at elections means that a relatively experienced workforce is available to draw 
upon. While this might suggest a limited pool of poll workers, the fact that a sizeable proportion are 
also recruited through other routes indicates a workforce which is nevertheless open to those with 
less or no experience.   
Poll workers were commonly described positively in the qualitative comments by their co-workers.  
However, in some instances poll workers claimed that their colleagues ‘muddled through’ and that 
their superiors ‘lacked leadership’.  Some poll workers suggested that elderly polling clerks were not 
up to the job.  As one put it: 
 ‘[We] need younger staff. Had one old lady who coughed the whole day and needed to 
go for frequent breaks and the other old lady couldn't lift anything either.’ 
Poll worker training 
Of all respondents, 92 per cent attended one training session prior to polling day. Such training can 
take a range of forms. Typically it consists of training by electoral services managers using 
presentations adapted from templates developed by the UK Electoral Commission. More occasionally, 
training might involve role play of possible scenarios, and additional material such as DVDs or 
literature to read through. Table 4 outlines various potential types of training and the views of poll 
workers as to its quality and effectiveness. The main form of training experienced by respondents was 
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a talk or presentation from a senior electoral official, which 82 per cent rated either good or excellent. 
Other methods were less regularly utilised. Nonetheless, literature to read on the polling process was 
widely thought either good or excellent, while approaches such as running through possible scenarios, 
or, where appropriate, on-the-day training from the Presiding Officer, were also well regarded. 
What of the content of training sessions? Most poll workers reported finding that the training was of 
appropriate length and interesting. Only 6 per cent thought the training too long, while 9 per cent 
thought it was boring. Most also appear to have felt that the content was useful; 71 per cent agreed 
that enough time had been spent covering election law and procedures, while 90 agreed the sessions 
had been easy to understand. More specific instructions also received similar agreement as to how 
useful they had been. For example, in relation to opening and closing the polling station, 93 per cent 
agreed that instructions for opening the polls had been clear, while 91 per cent agreed that 
instructions for closing the polls had also been clear. This is important given difficulties with queues 
as polls closed in 2010 which saw considerable variation in practice in affected polling stations (Clark 
2015). Finally, while 88 per cent agreed that instructions around voter identification were clear, only 
two thirds agreed that instructions regarding the casting of provisional ballots were clear. 
Overall, the poll workers appear to have thought that their training stood them in good stead for 
polling day. Four-fifths of respondents agreed that the training had prepared them well for election 
day, while 83 per cent indicated agreement with the statement that ‘after training I was confident in 
my ability to do my job on election day’. In total, 86 per cent rated their training either good or 
excellent.  Some were clearly unprepared, however.  As one poll worker put it: 
 ‘I felt very underprepared for role as only training was a talk through a leaflet. I had never 
done this job before and would have been very helpful if I had actually seen the register 
of electors and the corresponding number list. Although it was simple to pick up, still felt 
I should have been shown beforehand.’ 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
Other frontline problems on polling day 
A third category of possible problems relate to  the maladminstration of the poll.  The 2015 Poll Worker 
Survey suggested that the frequency of problems are low, but again not uncommon.  Table 5 details 
the different types of problems and their frequencies, with poll workers being offered a Likert scale to 
respond to. More problems were experienced setting up the polling station  (5 per cent either ‘agree’ 
or ‘strongly agree’) than closing down the poll (2 per cent).  In most cases poll workers worked well 
together on the day.  As with 2010, problems with queues were experienced, but this time they were 
more likely to be during (6 per cent either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’) than at the end of the day (3 per 
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cent either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’).  Queues during the day were found across all 8 local authorities 
and 16 of the 21 constituencies covered.   One poll worker, highlighting difficulties when elections for 
different institutions are held concurrently,  complained:  
 ‘The polling station needed extra staff and booths. There were constant queues as 
people had to wait to vote. The poll clerks were constantly explaining procedure as there 
were so many different papers holding up the system.  We also needed someone to assist 
with posting the votes in box and explaining the hold up to outside queues.’ 
 
Another complained of being ‘'ridiculously busy’ with ‘queues out of the doors for 90% of the time’:    
 ‘I managed to get 5 minutes for lunch but there was no time for anything else. We were 
all exhausted by the end of the day. More staff needed, even if just to give us better 
breaks.’ 
There were complaints by a few poll workers about the quality of the venue for the polling station.  
Some disabled voters reported problems to them accessing the building, others complained about the 
distance they had had to travel.  The building was sometimes described as being inapprorpiate.  One 
polling station was in a school while children were being taught.  Another described their  polling 
station as ‘wobbly and unsafe’. 
Ballot secrecy was also undermined in some circumstances.  Qualitative comments from poll workers 
revealed how ‘husband and wife’ might confer across polling booths and in one polling station: 
 ‘Quite a few people did not use the voting booths - they simply completed the voting slip 
on our desk in front of us so we could clearly see who they were voting for, despite us 
informing them otherwise.’ 
Duplicates and errors in the electoral register were also reported by poll workers.  A further problem 
was that citizens would ask to vote but would find that they had previously registered for a postal 
vote. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
Satisfaction with the Democratic Process 
To what extent are poll workers satisfied with the electoral and democratic process?  Since poll 
workers have unique knoweldge on how elections work on the ground, and where the difficulties are, 
their evaluations are important. If they exhibit large degrees of dissatisfaction, then it may be surmised 
that additional difficulties exist which have not yet been identified. The survey therefore asked a 
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number of questions regarding poll workers’ satisfaction with British democracy, and their satisfaction 
with their own role in the democratic process. 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 sets out responses to these questions on democratic satisfaction. On the whole, poll workers 
appear more satisfied than dissatisifed, even if more than a fifth show some level of dissatisfaction. 
Poll workers certainly appear more satisfied with the democratic process than the broader electorate 
they serve. For instance, the 2015 British Election Study shows that 49.9 per cent were either very or 
a little dissatisfied with UK democracy (N=30,027), while the equivalent finding on dissatisfaction with 
English democracy was 50.2 per cent (N=21,841).7 Importantly, there is broad satisfaction with how 
the electoral process works on polling day among poll workers. More than four fifths indicate some 
level of satisfaction with polling day operations, while only 5 per cent express any dissatisfaction. The 
highest level of dissatisfaction (18 per cent) exists when asked about levels of information people have 
on the electoral process. This is interesting because it confirms another similar finding, and suggests 
it remained relevant in 2015. This is that the accessibility of information to electors had the highest 
levels of non-compliance in the Electoral Commission’s performance standards for returning officers 
in the 2009 European and 2010 general elections (Clark 2015). Finally, respondents appear most 
uncertain or neutral about changes to the electoral process; just over two-fifths indcate neither 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction.  
While these questions adressed poll workers’ satisfaction with the electoral process generally, this can 
be separated from their own satisfaction, or otherwise, regarding their work on polling day. This is a 
very long day at work for them, beginning well before polls open at 7am, and going on beyond polls 
closing at 10pm as polling stations are packed up. There can be long periods of tedium with few voters 
turning out, and periods which are extremely busy. What level of job satisfaction do poll workers 
have? In short, they are highly satisfied; 99 per cent of respondents were either very or somewhat 
satisfied with their work on election day. Given that a sizeable number return to work regularly at 
elections, it might also be expected that high proprtions were planning to do so after 2015. Indeed, 
responses to a question asking whether respondents were likely to work at the next election suggested 
a higher proportion than probably will in actuality do so; 98 per cent indicated they were either very 
or somewhat likely to work at the next election. Whatever the reservations among poll workers about 
the electoral process, it does not appear to put them off working at it.  As one put it: 
 ‘I have been a poll worker many times and I enjoy the work. Other people should try this 
and get a greater understanding of the democratic process.’ 
Discussion 
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To what extent were the hypotheses confirmed or disconfirmed?  The suspected levels of electoral 
fraud by poll workers was low; lower than expected by H1.  It should be noted that the local authorities 
chosen were not among those cited by the Electoral Commission as being ‘at risk’ of electoral fraud.  
But the study seems to demonstrate that electoral fraud was not widespread and not taking place on 
‘an industrial scale’ as has often been implied.  It should be noted, however, that the study focussed 
on electoral fraud in the polling place and not postal voting fraud.  Yet the study does suggest that 
more liberal voting procedures such as the absence of voter ID does not necessarily go hand in hand 
with low levels of confidence and trust in the electoral process. 
 
In contrast, the study did reveal poll workers having to turn away a number of people from polling 
stations, confirming H2. This was a regular difficulty, experienced more often by poll workers than 
other problems, and suggests that although the focus of recent governments has been on increased 
security arrangements and proposals for voter identification requirements (Electoral Commission 
2014; Golds 2015), the quality of the electoral register is a more significant problem. 
Contrary to expectations (H3), the survey revealed that the administration of elections was generally 
good.  Poll workers were largely experienced, enjoyed their training and problems were rare.  The 
contrast with the US experience suggests that other democracies may be able to learn ‘best practice’ 
from the UK.   This is not to say that they were absent. Queues were a problem at pinch points in the 
day and this illustrates the importance of resources for well-run elections (Clark 2014; 2016; James 
2014a).   
Conclusion 
The polling station is a place where electoral malpractices are commonly thought to occur.  This 
chapter has made the case for the wide-spread use of poll worker surveys of learn more about the 
actual frequency of these problems and incentivise actors across the electoral process to maximise 
performance.  Through an original poll worker survey the chapter has revealed new findings about the 
integrity of the electoral process in Britain.  The findings partially contradict previous work on electoral 
malpractices in electoral administration which suggested that electoral fraud was the biggest problem 
plaguing British elections (Mawrey 2015; Sobolewska et al. 2015; Wilks-Heeg 2008).  Unlike their US 
counterparts, British poll workers tend to be experienced at working in the electoral process and are 
drawn from a commonly reused pool. They generally found the training of appropriate length, 
interesting and of practical use for the day.  They appear to have experienced few problems on the 
day in 2015. The difficulties they did face, although small in number and likely quite localised, remain 
significant. There is therefore a strong case for poll worker surveys becoming standard practice 
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amongst electoral administrators worldwide with the data being publicly available.  Although this 
would not always lead to policy change because of the many blockages to evidence based policy, this 
would significantly increase the transparency of elections, provide electoral managers with key 
performance information, enrich the scholarship on electoral integrity and help civil society to hold 
governments and electoral agencies to account.   
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Figure 1: A stagist approach to the impact of poll worker surveys on electoral integrity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Evidence collection
- Poll worker surveys
- Post election audits
2. Evidence 
dissemination
- EMB officials
- Media
- Political parties
- Civil servants 
3. Evidence Blockages
- Conflicting 
information
- Political resistence
- Cultural resistence
- Eoconomc restraint
4. Decision making / 
policy appraisal
- Internal EMB decisions
- Government policy
- Opposition party policy
- Pressure group 
strategies
5. Outcomes
Electoral integrity 
Outcomes
ELECTION WATCHDOGS 
20 
 
Table 1: Socio-economic/occupational representativeness of participating local authorities, 2011 
census (%) 
 Surveyed local 
authorities 
England & Wales 
Higher managerial, administration & professional 7.4 10.3 
Lower managerial, administration & professional 18.6 20.8 
Intermediate 13.0 12.7 
Semi-routine 17.2 14.1 
Routine 14.0 11.1 
Never worked & long-term unemployed 5.4 5.6 
Full time students 7.6 9.0 
Source: 2011 census, table KS611EW.   
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Table 2: Problems Experienced by Poll Workers (%) 
 None 1 2-5 6-10 10+ N 
Suspected cases of electoral fraud 99 1 0 0 0 1273 
People ask to vote whose identity I was 
unsure of 
94 5 1 0 0 1264 
People taking photos of ballot/polling 
stations 
95 5 1 0 0 1274 
Members of parties being where they 
shouldn’t be  
95 4 1 0 0 1273 
Members of parties intimidating public 95 2 2 1 0 1274 
People asking to vote but not on register 31 16 39 10 3 1271 
Source: 2015 British General Election Poll Workers Survey  
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Table 3: Recruitment methods % 
Worked at previous elections  55 
By a local council official  15 
By volunteering  12 
By another poll worker  7 
Official job posting by council  6 
Other  5 
N  1298 
Source: 2015 British General Election Poll Workers Survey  
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Table 4: Forms of Poll Worker Training Methods % 
 Did not 
receive 
Poor Fair Good Excellent N 
Talk/presentation from 
senior election official 
3 3 12 52 30 1227 
Video/DVD 81 1 3 11 3 1144 
Role-playing of scenarios 85 1 4 7 3 1129 
Q & A of possible scenarios 29 2 17 38 14 1166 
On the day training by the 
Presiding Officer  
49 1 5 26 20 1019 
Informal telephone 
conversation with election 
official 
78 1 3 11 7 1116 
Booklets to read through 0 1 10 53 36 1215 
Source: 2015 British General Election Poll Workers Survey  
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Table 5: Electoral maladministration at the polls (%) 
 Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Neither 
agree 
or 
disagre
e 
Agree Strongl
y agree 
N 
Problems setting up 
polling station 
64 28 3 4 1 1306 
Problems closing polling 
station 
64 31 3 1 1 1256 
Poll workers worked well 
together 
3 1 1 26 70 1303 
Voting process went 
smoothly at my polling 
station 
3 1 2 37 57 1291 
Problems with queues 
during the day 
48 38 8 4.0 2 1295 
Problems with queues 
towards end of the day 
56 36 5 1 2 1276 
Source: 2015 British General Election Poll Workers Survey  
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Table 6: Satisfaction with democractic process (%) 
 Very 
dissatisfie
d 
Dissatisfie
d 
Neither  Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
N 
How British 
democracy works 
generally 
4 20 28 44 5 1286 
How electoral 
process works on 
polling day 
1 4 12 61 22 1286 
Level of information 
about electoral 
process 
3 15 27 48 7 1285 
Changes to how 
electoral process 
works 
2 12 41 41 5 1275 
       Source: 2015 British General Election Poll Workers Survey  
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West. Norfolk: Broadland; Norwich North; Norwich South; Great Yarmouth; North West Norfolk; 
South West Norfolk.     
5This was measured on a scale of performance ranging from scores of 7 to 21. The mean for the eight 
local authorities in this study was 15.13; the nationwide mean was 15.75.  See Clark (2015) for more 
detail.  
6 Party campaigners may however see this as a legitimate campaign activity. Constituency campaigning 
surveys in British general elections have regularly asked about party activists taking numbers outside 
polling stations (Denver and Hands 1997).  
7 Data from Wave 6. The British Election Study data is available at: 
http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/ [23/7/2015].  
                                                 
